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I
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The study described here is part of a project financed by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to examine and evaluate the consequences of government regulation on the U.S. copper industry. There have been many attempts
to understand the economy-wide consequences of particular forms of regulation, even of the family of regulations administered by a particular governmental agency.' There have been far fewer studies of the effects of a variety
of regulations on a particular target group. A single industry can be the target of many different kinds of regulation, not only by different agencies at
the same level of government, but also by agencies at federal, state and local
levels. Taking the perspective of a single regulated group is important to our
growing awareness of the need to evaluate regulation as searchingly as government expenditure programs. Regulatory constraints from different sources
may offset or augment one another with regard to achievement of regulatory
goals and to the real social costs imposed on the economy. Mutual coordination, explicit or tacit, of different types of regulation and attention to the
temporal change of regulations may be critical in increasing the efficiency of
such programs enough to save them from the rising tide of criticism.
Our project has attempted to provide a theoretical and quantitative framework for measuring and evaluating the consequences of different forms of
regulations. The data base laboriously developed and the analytical model to
which it is to be applied are intended to permit tracing various kinds of
regulatory constraint. We have chosen three federal programs to illustrate
how the model works-assignment and change of water rights, federal land
withdrawal from mineral exploitation, and air pollution control, but a wide
variety of constraints can be dealt with.
* Research Project, Applied Research on the Benefit and Costs of Public Regulation of the
Copper Industry, National Science Foundation Contract ARP 77-19752
t Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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One consequence to which the model is sensitive is investment in new and
different facilities. Several extant technologies are available to firms wishing
to replace or extend their current facilities. These technologies differ in
profitability as adaptations to various kinds of regulation-including especially
air pollution control among the three we illustrate. Thus, the model is capable
of predicting (at least in principle) what technical modifications will be chosen
from among existing technologies. Moreover, by examining the loss of
profitability (and/or markets) suffered by the industry when even the most favorable currently available technology is chosen as a response to new regulation, an implicit demand for innovation in the desired direction can be
inferred.
Regulatory change may induce a "defensive" or "reactive" form of innovation. It may also influence "initiatory" innovation. This type is generated to
shift relative market shares or preclude potential entry or simply to enhance
profitability because of the inherent malleability of technology with respect to
either products or productive processes. It is usually believed that such initiatory innovation, given the special features of the industry in question, is encouraged by high accumulated retained earnings-and ultimately, of continued high rates of return. Because of their level and changes in level,
regulatory constraints can affect returns adversely enough to significantly deplete research and development (R&D) budgets and so initiatory innovations.
Overall innovationary activity may rise or fall depending on the extent to
which reactive and initiatory innovations compete with one another for scarce
resources. Our model does not explicitly treat initiatory innovation or R&D
budgets. It provides an important input to this relationship by predicting the
profit consequences of different kinds of regulation.
Time and resource limitations have led us to a research strategy of successive approximation in model specification. We have designated a relatively
simple (but nonetheless complex) model as a first cut, to explore some of the
most salient features of the real world. We hope to substitute more elaborate
components in future work. The model described here should therefore be
understood not as a final statement of the real relational web, but as a first
entry that possesses enough richness to illuminate many of the salient issues
in this area.
The methodology of the study is as follows. We seek to evaluate the positive and negative consequences of each of a number of regulatory programs,
both singly and in groups. The positive aspects relate to the achievement of
the goals of the regulatory program that results from the regulation-induced
modification of industry behavior. The negative aspects refer to the direct
and indirect adjustments made by the industry in the face of the real cost of
the modifications induced by regulatory constraint. For example, if regulations call for a stack scrubber and installation of such equipment leads to
sharp decrease in sulphur dioxide emissions; the improved health, agricul-
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tural productivity, etc. in the downwind area constitute regulatory benefits.
The resulting increased cost to the industry of remaining in business, on the
other hand, leads to input mix, output level, price and even locational adjustments, as well as a changed degree of competition with foreign copper suppliers. These input-price-net import changes are components of the real social
cost of the regulation.
The scheme has four main segments:
1. a classification of degrees of stringency for each type of regulation
we have chosen to illuminate;
2. a model of the copper industry (from exploration to refining) that
determines current output-price decisions at all the stages ("current production module");
3. a model of the effect of each kind of industry compliance with the
various regulatory levels on the (generally) externality dimensions
whose control is the goal of the regulatory programs ("regulatory
compliance/externalities module"); and
4. a model of induced industry investment, both of normal capacity
replacements and additions and of special equipment and other
compliance systems ("investment module").
We begin with an assumed change in some portion of the regulatory regime
impinging on the industry. This induces a direct compliance action-purchase
and installation of a new system, modified input mix or output level or temporal pattern, or early replacement of plant with one embodying a different
technology. The effects of these charges on regulatory goal achievement is
traced via the compliance/externality module. The new technology-cost situation facing the industry leads the industry to change its current input/output/price behavior. This is traced via the current production module.
An important consequence of these current operations impacts is a change
in industry profitability. So, in addition to any investments that represent direct compliance with regulatory requirements, the changed profitability influences industry decisions about capacity additions at different stages of production. These are traced via the investment module. Thus, both short and
long run effects on industry operations and on achievement of regulatory
goals are predicted by the model complex.
A distinctive feature of our approach is our disaggregation of the industry
into five production stages: exploration, mining, milling, smelting and refining.' Each stage is viewed as receiving inputs from the preceeding stage
and sending its outputs to the succeeding stage. Since different kinds of regulation impact the different production stages unequally; disaggregation into
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the processes of each stage enables us to capture the specific impacts with
much greater sensitivity and subtlety than if the industry were described as a
single-stage aggregate. Of course this differentiation complicates the modeling
effort. To keep complexity within feasible bounds we have had to make a
number of simplifications in this first-round model variant. First, we have assumed away inter-firm competition at each stage and between stages, treating
the industry as a single efficiently maximizing unit. Second, we treat locational
decisions as exogenous, not endogenous. Third, we omit the scrap market.
Other simplifying assumptions will be presented and explained in the course
of the exposition. We especially want to relax the three mentioned here in
subsequent model variants since they concern interesting issues.
II
COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL

A.

Firm and Industry

In modeling the U.S. copper industry, a number of simplifying assumptions must be made if the results are to be analytically tractable. For the present, we model the industry as if it were a scaled-up version of one of its major
parts-a simple, vertically integrated firm. In fact, a large part of the industry
is made up of a few such firms, whose operations run from exploration
through mining to refining. Of course, not all of the inputs to a given facility
under the firm's control arise within the firm, nor does all that facility's output pass to other facilities controlled by the firm; nevertheless, most of the
important links pertaining to such firms are internal. Therefore a single-firm
model seems to be a good approximation to the greater complexity of the industry as a whole.
This assumption simplifies the representation of many of the transactions
between productive facilities, because a single objective function may be assumed to govern these transactions when the facilities belong to a single firm.
This is not equivalent to assuming that the industry is a single monopoly. It
does not prejudge the power of the industry in the market. It merely implies
that, whatever the internal competitive process and governmental constraints
that determine an aggregate price-output position consistent with the industry
demand function, the output is produced at least cost for the industry as a
whole. The relative internal stability often expected of highly concentrated
oligopolies such as the copper industry makes this a fair approximation to
reality.
Thus, we assume that interfacility, interstage transactions within the industry are conducted as though the industry were a single firm. We do not specify how this firm adopts a price strategy for the market. However, once a
price has been established, the industry responds by maximizing aggregate in-
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dustry profit: it supplies an amount of copper such that marginal cost to the
industry equals market price.
For the present we assume that some production stages comprise a single
facility-for instance, only one production technology at the mill or refinery,
or in exploration. In reality, a variety of technologies will be available at each
stage, but circumstances will generally make one of them most profitable. We
assume that this technology will be adopted by the industry as a whole.
Changes in regulatory stringency will typically alter the relative profitabilities
of the different technologies, and thus will induce some technological shift.
The present model can indicate the direction and magnitude of such shifts by
determining the relative profitabilities of different technological structures
under identical regulatory regimes.
The exceptions to the assumption of a single facility are the mining and
smelting stages. Because we wish to allow for differences in grade and in deposit depletion, and for the resulting shutdown of old mines and replacement
by new ones over time, we assume a distribution of mines of different grades
and ages (i.e., percent of deposit removed) in each period, along with the existence of an inventory of different discovered, but as yet undeveloped, deposits. For smelting, we wish to permit different technologies to be adopted as
adjustments to changing regulatory constraints; so in the context of high
smelter durability different kinds of facilities will be in operation as a reflection of the different circumstances prevailing at the time of their construction.
The level of aggregation of the model represents a compromise. By
aggregating all facilities into a single facility at each stage, we avoid the troublesome issues of relative and absolute facility size, and specific input-output
relations between facilities. Nevertheless, production stages remain distinct in
the model because different types of regulation may affect each stage in different ways.
Subsequent refinements of this model will introduce more than one facility
at each stage, some with different technology. This will permit a more exact
investigation of differential effects of regulations. A further refinement will
attempt to introduce competitive relations between firms within the context of
oligopoly.
B.

Objective Function

The assumption that the industry can be represented by the behavior of a
single firm means that industry behavior is directed toward the maximization
of a single objective function. This implies not just that all facilities have a
common standard of performance, but that, more particularly, a unit increase
in the level of the objective function due to the operation at any one facility is
as good as a unit increase anywhere else.
The objective function measures industry earnings, but the form and defi-
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nition of earnings are not self-evident. As would be expected, the need to
model intertemporal trade-offs leads to a formulation in terms of present discounted values, but there is an unusual complication in that the whole industry is based on the exploitation of a depletable resource, copper reserves. The
basic trade-off is this: by mining a unit of reserves in the present, the industry
incurs an opportunity cost because it will not be able to mine that unit (and
gain the associated profits) in the future. Because significant stockpiling is
costly, this trade-off can have several ramifications which significantly complicate the task of modeling. Shall a unit of reserves be mined today, at today's
prices, or next year, when prices are expected to be higher? Shall a low-grade
ore be mined today if doing so permits a high-grade ore to be mined, even
though the low-grade falls below the minimum economical (cutoff) grade
given present prices; or should the lower-grade, and the higher-grade linked
to it, not be mined until a later date when higher copper prices lower the cutoff grade? (The risks associated with such decisions lie not only in the length
of postponement, but in the possibility that the mine will shut down permanently before that unit or those units have been exploited.) Or, along similar
lines, should lower-grades be mined whenever prices render them profitable,
so as to decrease the risk that lower prices in the future will force them to remain in the ground forever?
Decisions about such intertemporal choices lead to two forms of waste.
First, grades of ore may be mined that are not worth sending to the mill because the downstream processing costs exceed expected revenues. Such ores,
which fall below the economical cutoff grade, are mined because knowledge
of the distribution of reserves is never exact, so that such ores may be mined
by chance, and because, in some cases, excavation of high-grade reserves requires that low-grade ores be moved to expose them. This form of waste
could be regarded as an unavoidable cost of mining (in the same sense that
clearing overburden is a cost) except that ores dumped as waste today might
well have proved profitable if mined in the future under a different set of
prices and production costs. So whether or not an ore is waste is determined
by pervading circumstances at the time of mining.
A second form of waste can be identified when a mine shuts down permanently with part of its original reserves unexploited--even grades which currently exceed the cutoff grade. This comes about when, as a result of past
mining decisions, the mine is left with a distribution of ores which, given geological constraints, cannot be mined profitably at current prices.
Both forms of waste are variable and depend upon a particular pattern of
intertemporal choices, which in turn depends upon expectations of costs and
selling prices. Public regulations can have a significant effect on costs over
time. Because of the durability of the capital equipment required for compliance, and because of the practical irreversibility of waste dumping, the pattern
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of regulatory change over time may significantly influence the social cost of
regulation. We intend to examine such effect by imposing regulatory timeprofiles on the model.
Our treatment of the firm's objective function for current operations attempts to capture some of the essence of intertemporal choice by careful specification of single-period profits, rather than by expanding the domain of
the function over multiple periods. We assumed that the firm attempts to
maximize profits from operations in the current period alone. Profits are defined as revenues from current output, minus costs of producing that output.
Costs for labor, energy, water, and capital are defined conventionally. The
cost of reserves used in producing output are more difficult to determine.
The cost of using the reserves in the current period is that they are no
longer available for use in the future, i.e., the opportunity cost of future exploitation of that specific amount and kind of reserve. What is lost is the
profitability of that future use expressed in present value terms. We calculate
the profitability by assuming that, relative to an earlier,foregoneuse the particular reserve has zero opportunity cost in the later use. The revenue and costs
involved in the reserve's later use are those expected to prevail in the relevant
future. Ideally, both cost and revenue expectation are assumed to be held
(with perfect confidence) for all future periods. The optimization program
for the whole industry is run for each of those periods (assuming zero cost
for the reserve itself) and present discounted value of profits noted. The
highest of such future present values becomes the opportunity cost of the reserve for the current period. For practical feasibility, calculation for multiple
alternative future periods is generally eschewed, and in the basic model we
simply calculate future profitability for one period into the future, except
when exploring the behavior of the industry under an assumed highly variable future price and/or cost profile.
Since the cost of future profitability in using depletable reserves is included as an explicit cost of today's use of them, current period profits will be
positive only if today's use is more profitable than expected future use. Thus,
the intertemporal choice issue is directly confronted. The most complicated
expected future scenarios about prices and costs can be handled by variants of
the basic procedure where the maximum of an appropriate, limited, multiperiod set of future alternatives is calculated.
More complex aspects of intertemporal choice can of course be dealt with
by specifying an explicit multiperiod model (for which dynamic programming
must be used, instead of the static linear programming problem we formulate
here). Complicated sequence patterns can be predicted. Some of the issues
raised by these properties are significant. We have decided to make our first
approximation model a two-period opportunity cost model (today versus the
best future) for a number of reasons:
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1. it is simpler;
2. it captures the substance of present exploitation versus delay issues;
3. it permits a simpler, powerful investment module specification,
since gains from capacity expansion are directly generated from
it;
4. it permits the modeling of industry surprises when regulatory
stringency is changed, since the multiperiod model requires expectations for all future years;
5. we are less interested in a particular temporal sequence of outcomes than in the "settled-down" steady-state consequences of
regulatory changes;
6. industry experts report that explicit multi-year future profiles are
not in fact made. Nonetheless, we hope to employ a multiperiod
formulation in the future, to compare with the properties of the
simpler two-period model.
C.

Overview of the System

We are concerned with the following stages of copper production: exploration, mining, milling, smelting, refining. The last four are linked on a daily
basis in current production operations. Exploration is not linked with mining
for current operation, but only to provide an inventory of discovered copper
deposits, some of which will be developed into new mines in the future. Thus,
exploration is a form of long run investment in new mine capacity and will be
treated as such.
We assume the industry comprises a single multifacility firm. There are
many mines and mills, fewer smelters and refineries. In this model variant, we
are not concerned with how many there are, or their size distribution, or who
ships what to whom to make up the inter-stage flow of throughput from mining to refined copper market. The industry has a number of interfaces with
the rest of the world: it buys productive resources from resource owners for
both current production operations and investment in productive capacity; it
sells refined copper to the United States and world refined copper market; its
operations affect the quality of the environment and the availability of certain
special natural resources, like land and water, for other uses (e.g., recreation).
All three interfaces are treated explicitly in the model.
1.Current ProductionModule
The characteristics of each facility are assumed to remain constant over
the course of each year; all changes in capacity and other parameters take
place instantaneously at the end of each period. As a result of demand and
supply interaction in the market for refined copper (which depends on world

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 43: No. I

demand and supplies other than those in the United States) at the end of the
preceding period, the new period begins with a price of refined copper facing
the U.S. industry. On the basis of this actual market price (which the market
power of the U.S. industry may have helped determine), the refining facilities
make an optimization decision that consists of setting an internal bid price
which they will be willing to pay for each ton of blister copper "sold" to them
by smelters such that they will be willing to accept total quantities as determined by the smelter facilities, but constrained by current refining capacity.
Thus, refiners actively set buying prices and passively accept quantities determined earlier in the production process. The sense in which this type of
price/quantity strategy is optimal will be examined below. The refinery actively sets a bid price only for the copper throughput. All other productive resources set their own prices at which they are willing to be used by the
smelter.
The refiner's bid price for anode copper is based on both the refined copper price in the market and the cost of refining it. In this context of a specific
production cost situation, the market price is "passed-through" the refining
stage to the smelting stage. Corresponding to this backward price passthrough, operating decisions result in a throughput pass-through of blister
copper into refined copper.
The same process occurs at the smelting stage. Based on the price at which
the smelter can sell its output of blister copper (the refiner's bid price) and
the cost of producing it, it sets its own bid prices for throughput flowing to it
from the milling stage. As in refining, other productive resources used in
smelting set their own selling prices. Determination of pass-through bid
prices, with a willingness passively to allow quantities of throughput to be determined by the mills (subject to smelter capacity constraints) constitutes an
optimization process for the smelter. Here it is more complicated than for
refining because more than one grade of concentrate is subjected to transformation into blister copper. Since the real cost of producing a ton of homogeneous output differs when different grades of concentrate are used, each concentrate grade will be given a different bid price, the differences reflecting

differences in cost to produce a given output. Details of optimal bid pricing
will be presented below. So, blister prices are passed backward to milling and
the resulting operating decisions at the mill and smelter result in a determinate forward throughput pass-through from concentrates to blister.
The same process, with a further complication, occurs at the milling stage.
Here there are more than one kind of throughput input and output: different grades of ore from the mine as well as different grades of concentrate
output. The marginal cost of each input grade differs depending on which
output grade it is used for. Since this latter decision is made by the mill, not
the mine, only a single bid price must be set for each input grade used, re-
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gardless of what specific use is made of it. At the same time the price must
enable the mill to accept what quantities of ore are offered by the mineagain, as modified by the mill's capacity constraints-and allocate ore inputs
optimally to output processes. Thus, bid prices are set on different ore grade
by an optimization process. In response, supplying mines will bring quantities
of the various ore grades to the mill-again, a backward price pass-through
inducing a distinctive forward pass-through of the throughput.
Finally, at the mine, the ore bid prices (in conjunction with the different
generally probabilistic, cost of producing each kind of ore and various capacity constraints) elicit a decision by the mine on a level and selection of mining activities and on the basis of this decision appropriate ores are sent to the
mill: a complete backward price pass-through induces a complete forward
throughput of copper. The twin movements result from optimization decisions. The optimization is modeled as linear programming maximization of
the objective function for each stage. To simplify actual programming we
have divided the four current operating stages into two groups: mining and
downstream processing (milling, smelting, refining). Based on market prices
for refined copper (however they are in fact set), group two maximizes its
profits. This generates bid prices for ore outputs from mining. Taking these
bid prices as selling prices, the mining stage makes production decisions to
maximize its profits. The resulting mine output either just meets downstream
processing capacity or not. If it does, this set of outputs/pass-through prices
represents the industry's "supply response" to the refined copper price. If it
does not, an iterative procedure changes bid prices until convergence is
reached.
For a given set of technologies and productive capacities, the initial price
will elicit a certain supply of refined copper from the industry to the market.
This supply need not necessarily be equal to demand at that price. (Demand
is derived from an aggregate demand function for U.S. production, scaled
down by the ratio of the firm's capacity to total U.S. capacity.) If demand and
supply differ, the model uses a mechanism that progressively forces convergence of the two. It involves successively trying new adjustment prices that
narrow the demand-supply divergence. We obtain the first of these adjustment prices by stating at the amount supplied at the initial price and
determining from the demand function what price would be required to elicit
an amount demanded equal to that quantity. The new adjustment price is
simply the average of this price and the initial one. Substituted into the
model, the new adjustment price elicits another supply level at the market,
closer to the new level of demand this time. This generates a new adjustment
price. The process is continued until convergence is obtained. At this point, a
short run equilibrium between supply and demand has been obtained and the
results of the model are accepted as 'real' for the current period.
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2. The Regulatory Compliance/ExternalitiesModule
In addition to its linkage with earlier and later production stage each facility has various relations with the "outside" world. One consists in competing
for especially scarce, even unique productive resources (water in the Southwest), or certain wilderness lands. Another consists in generating negative externalities such as polluted air and water or dangerous and unhealthy working conditions. Production stages differ markedly in their demand for special
resources and in their environmental effects; the model therefore distinguishes these quantities for each stage. Given a technology and set of
operating procedures, the size and character of social impacts due to each facility is a direct function of operating level. The output of the current production module provides the information necessary to assess these impacts.
This assessment is to be carried out, of course, in the context of current governmental regulations. In the model this takes the form of performance
standards, emission ceilings, water allocations, and land leases or withdrawals.
Compliance with regulation is dealt with in two ways. Most simply, we assume complete compliance with a regulatory regime by a particular means.
Typically, this will take the form of investment in specific equipment, which
changes the total cost of production and sometimes the variable (marginal)
cost of production. Profitability will always be affected by regulation; optional
production level and factor mix will sometimes be affected. On the other
hand, externalities will be reduced to the required level. The existence of
alternative acceptable compliance strategies is dealt with by applying overall
consequences. The more complex treatment consists in applying each of the
most relevant alternative compliance strategies to the industry supply model,
selecting the one which results in the highest industry profitability as the
optimal strategy, and predicting that the industry will in fact adopt it.
Different compliance strategies will not only differentially affect industry
operations and profitability but also the level and character of externalities. So
the regulation/externality module predicts social impacts as well as industry
adjustments.
3. Investment Module
For given technology, regulatory compliance and initial productive capacity, the current production module predicts a demand-supply-market price
equilibrium via industry-wide optimization (calculated as a linear programming problem) and market clearing adjustment. This equilibrium rests on a
supply response that reflects the initial resource constraints resulting from
initial productive capacities at the various stages. Our linear programming solution to the industry maximization problem generates shadow prices in each of
these capacities that proved a binding constraint. These shadow prices provide
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the key to the third major type of interface the industry makes with the outside: investment in additional capacity.
A binding constraint generates a positive shadow price, which indicates the
amount by which a unit increment in that capacity would increase the level of
objective function goal achievement in each subsequent period (assuming
other conditions unchanged). This indicates therefore, what such an increment would be worth each future period to the investing firm under
unchanging conditions. The investment module compares that prospective
flow of returns from investment with the cost of adding one unit of such capacity. No questions of minimum necessary scale of investment arise because,
having aggregated all facilities at each stage to a fictional "average" or typical
facility, "unit" increases at a particular stage are large relative to actual individual facilities; each can be allocated among individual facilities to avoid ac3
tual lumpiness constraints.
For post-mining stages this is straightforward. Additional plant and equipment can be added to an existing operational site or can serve to establish a
new operating site. At the mining stage, it generally means the development
of a new mine physically separated from existing sites. This is possible because the shadow price process does not put an opportunity cost (or profit enhancing) valuation only on reserves in already-developed mines but also in deposits held by the industry as an inventory for future mine development. This
is the analytical link between the exploration stage and all the others. Exploration creates an inventory of reserves which have a potential marginal (incremental) value for the industry given by the shadow prices or reserves of different grade. The cost of developing each into an operating mine determines
3. The calculation is as follows:
Let a particular productive capacity i have shadow price Pj associated with it at the beginning
of time period j (in effect, the end of time period j-l). Let the cost of producing an additional
unit of it at j be CQj. Then the expected rate of return from the discounted gains of the investment in an extra unit of i is:
(1)

R1,

P

l

( ±r)k

CC,]

:

CC,,

where T is the expected lifetime of the proposed investment. We compare Rj with the required

(target) rate of return for the stage of production involved (we shall use the same rate for all
stages), pj,as follows:
(2)

IPij = I (Rij-pj)
with 0 = 1 (0) 1 > 0

where IP is investment potential. So any excess of Rij
over pj generates investment in capital capacity i, the amount of investment being that amount which when in place (assumed to be one
period in the future j+ 1) will, all other things equal, reduce the rate of return on that capacity in
j+ 1 to p: i.e., capacity will be expanded to the extent that, when a new shadow price is generated
in j+ 1, it will imply Rjj+1 = pj+. (Our greater interest in "steady-state" than in dynamic sequence

consequences is shown in our willingness to assume a one-period gestation period for investment.
This can easly be modified to permit longer and different gestation periods for different stages.)
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marginal profitability. The rate of new mine development then depends on
the same overall output supply considerations that determine how much additional capitalcapacity of any sort is warranted by the market at any time.
4. Inter-Modular Flow
a.

Market Clearing Scenario

Market equilibrium determines not only copper production but also its
"by product" environmental incursions, mostly externalities. The amount and
character of these incursions is determined as a function of current operations-output level and input mix in the context of compliance with the existing regulatory regime by the regulatory compliance/externalities module.
This module, in its short run form, assumes that a compliance strategy with
existing regulations has been implemented by the industry in the form of special equipment or operational procedures, so that its current equilibrium production decisions suffice to determine the vector of externalities and other
non- or quasi-market incursions in the current period.
The production equilibrium, and its externalities by products, represent
only a short run resting place, however. At that equilibrium, various types of
productive and compliance capacity will constrain the solution. These will
have generated positive shadow (efficiency) prices. The investment module
gauges which of these capacities would raise total industry profitability
by being expanded through investment. Where such prospective profitability
exists, new investment takes place, both for production capacity and compliance equipment. Capacity is enlarged to a degree where further additions
would earn no more than the rate of return on existing capital.
The adjusted capital stock changes industry costs, thus in general the previous market price will elicit a new, generally higher amount supplied, followed by a new iterative market adjustment convergence process among price,
demand and supply. The new equilibrium resulting will be a long run equilibrium in that both capacity and its utilization are tailored to market demand.
Similarly, the change from short to long run operational equilibrium will generate a change in externality incursions. So all three modules are constantly
interacting to produce a three way mutually compatible situation.
b.

Regulatory Change Scenario

The main reason for developing the overall model is to predict and evaluate the effect of regulatory change. Suppose, then, a long run three way equilibrium has been achieved. Now let there be a change in the regulatory
regime; a particular regulation is tightened or loosened. First, the
regulatory/externality module enables us to calculate the profitability of the
changed set of permissible compliance strategies, then predicts adoption of
the new maximum profitability strategy. This different strategy generally
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changes industry costs (at particular production stages) and so elicits a different supply response than heretofore. Again, the current production module is
called upon to trace these supply adjustments and resulting market adjustment convergence process, leading to a new short run and then, via the investment module, to a new long run equilibrium. At this new output-input
mix-compliance technique situation, the externality module predicts the character of externality incursions. Once again, all three modules interact to form
the new three way coherence.
c. Demand-Cost-Technology
Regulatory changes are the focus of the overall analysis. But the performance of different regulatory regimes under alternative industry contexts is
an important aspect of this investigation. This is accomplished by hypothetically varying (exogenously) world and U.S. demand conditions, cost conditions
and technologies over time. In a later, nonhomogeneous industry model,
more than one cost and technological situation can be envisaged simultaneously by applying them to different parts of the industry, respectively.
Begin with a particular demand-cost-technological situation. This generates
a long run three way equilibrium. Now let any of these components of the situation hypothetically change. Via the production and investment modules this
will generate a new long run equilibrium, and via the regulatory/externality
module this will in turn generate a new flow of externalities (as well as possibly changed compliance strategies).
In general, then, any exogeneous change impinging on the system calls for
mutual adjustments registered by all three modules.
D.

Optimization and Inter-Stage Linkages

The mining and downstream sectors optimize by maximizing their respective profits. As indicated above, this interactive optimization process results in
pass-through "bid prices" being set at the interface between the two sectors
that elicits a throughput flow that simultaneously satisfies capacity and other
constraints in both sectors. These bid prices indicate the real opportunity cost
of transforming the throughput input into output at that stage. They are an
appropriate downstream profitability indicator to earlier production stages.
Each type of throughput input receives a separate bid price. Differentials
among them indicate differential downstream profitability for the different
types of input, given input-output relations, and therefore serve to allocate
mining and processing capacity efficiently among the different input grades.
In each bid price, the prices for all variable nonthroughput input are
those set on appropriate factor markets and are, in this treatment, out of the
control of the purchasing copper facility. The situation is different for fixed
capital (capacity) "used up." The cost of capital "used up" per unit of each ac-
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tivity is the sum of depreciation, maintenance and repair and the opportunity
cost of capital to the facility. For this version of the model, we assume very
long durability; so to a first approximation we can take depreciation as zero.
The cost of capital "used up" is thus measured as the cost of maintenance and
repair, and the opportunity cost of capital. The former can be sensitive to total level of activity; the latter is not. Opportunity cost of capital is the "target
rate of return" on the total capital in that facility. This is a given quantity with
given total value. A target rate of return means applying a given percentage
of this value; it is a return fixed in size in the current period. Therefore, the
opportunity cost per unit of activity is a declining function of total use, and
thus profitability varies inversely to this.
Thus, the bid price pass-through procedure allows for variable profits, the
variability stemming from capital capacity. It thus reflects the efficiency in use
of both variable and fixed inputs at any period.
E.

Costs and Production Constraints

Our treatment of the technology-cost characteristics of all stages is similar,
but with appropriate modifications at each stage. For each plant at each stage,
the period begins with a given capital installation embodying a particular technology of production and complaince with the current regulatory regime.
This installation implies certain capacity constraints on current production. We
assume a stepwise linear technology and cost function; i.e., we break down the
range of production possibility into a number (usually three) of operation intervals. In each of those intervals a slightly different fixed-proportions linear
technology is specified. The middle (the widest-interval) is the range of normal
operations, where resource requirements per unit of output are lowest; operation levels higher than that possible when using equipment beyond normal capacity rates, but they increase real resource costs of each output unit via
postponing and shortening examination and maintenance periods, increasing
maintenance and repair requirements, increasing labor fatigue, etc. Operation
levels lower than the normal range, to a lesser extent, make production in that
range more expensive than normal because they may make it harder for the
different productive factors to combine in the most efficient proportions or in
the best rhythm (e.g., unoccupied periods may be more numerous, making
start-up and shut-down costs greater than with steady operations). We assume
that input prices (except for interstage throughput) are fixed to the individual
facility, so different real resource requirements (i.e., variable, not fixed inputs)
are translated proportionally into differential per unit production costs. (Thus,
the higher unit costs for the low level interval is not due to distributing fixed
costs over a smaller number of output units, but to higher variable costs per
unit of output.)
The technology attributed to the mining stage is special in a number of
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ways. We have tried to capture a number of the distinctive features of "real
world" copper mining while keeping the analysis tractable, so as to make it
widely applicable (at least as an approximation) through parametric variation.
We have incorporated:
1. the heterogeneity of reserve grades in a given deposit and their
spatial irregularity within the deposit;
2. the technical inability to excavate only the ore grades desired, having to remove grades above and often to the sides of grades one
wants, even if one knows the exact location of the desired grades;
3. inadequate knowledge about the grade identity of different parts
of the deposit;
4. despite these, knowledge and ability sufficient to enable some differentiation and selection of average grade excavations.
We assume that in the base period five different mine types exist, distinguished by average grade, in current operation, and a queue of five different
undeveloped deposit types, also distinguished by average grade and arrayed
in descending average grade order.
The quantities of these deposits are assumed as follows:
1. the total amount of each average grade in operating mines at the
start of the base period equals the actual distribution in the copper industry in 1970, as developed in our data base;
2. the total amount of each average grade in discovered but
undeveloped deposits at the beginning of the base period is our
estimate of the actual amount in the industry inventory as of
1970;
3. the age-average grade distribution for the five operating mine
types is based on the actual distribution in 1970;
4. amounts of the capacity in each average grade to be added by investment (either replacement or net additions) is assumed to be
continuous up to the total available amount under three above.
Since our mine types are aggregates of individual mines, each type made up
of several individual deposits, we avoid problems of lumpiness in investment.
Each individual mine is assumed to consist of a single deposit of given average grade, comprising a number of elementary grades distributed lognormally.
Each mine can extract material selectively for a mean grade that differs
from the deposit's average grade, R , but only to a limited degree in the upward direction. By stripping additional cover, the average grade actually removed can be entirely free of metallic content. Thus, the range of average
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grade minable in any period t1 is from 0 to k (I+E). Our practice is to take E
as 10 percent.
Our behavioral hypothesis is that in each period t, the mine selects that
mean grade to be extracted, lR1 , which will maximize profits (in the sense
given in the objective function). Since E is small, we assume that the constituent grades making up 1k are also distributed log-normally. In period t, material extracted is divided into ore (to be sent to the mill) and waste (to be
dumped). Waste consists of all grades below a cutoff grade that is determined
by the price of refined copper and downstream processing costs, which in
combination with the price of refined copper, would result in losses.
At the end of each period, the mine's remaining deposit must be adjusted
for metallic material extracted. Thus, the mine's aging is in terms of the total
of reserves already extracted and the part remaining.
In ti different mines may well select a different Ri if they are all attempting to extract the highest grade possible, since they begin the period
with a different initial R. However, if market conditions dictate a lower-thanmaximal average grade as optimal, then all mines might conceivably select the
same optimal grade.
In smelting, we assume an initial set of facilities with the different
technologies existing in 1970, and quantitatively distributed in the actual 1970
proportions. These technologies differ in required input mixes as well as cost
and productivity. Their relative as well as absolute profitability are influenced
by the character of regulatory constraints in the industry. So changes in these
constraints can induce technological shifts either through supplantation or net
additions to capacity.
The second major distinguishing feature of our treatment of mining technology is that real cost of extraction is time bound: the older the mine in
terms of percent of deposit already mined, the higher the cost of extracting a
given amount of material. This reflects the deepening of the open pit with its
attendant increasing distances needed to carry materials.
In addition to embedding stepwise linearity of production functions with
the noted modifications for mining, the installations at the beginning of each
period embody various capacity constraints. At each stage the typical facility
experiences capacity constraints. The given scale of capital implies the location
of the normal, redundant and forced operations intervals. Moreover, the
forced operation interval is not open ended; there is an absolute ceiling beyond which current production levels cannot go. For smelting and mining
capital constraints are the only ones specified. For mining and milling additional constraints are assumed.
In mining and milling we assume that water may be subject to absolute
ceilings in any period. Water can be obtained from rivers and streams or federal water project sources to the extent of water rights held; additional sup-
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plies (wells) must be developed by the facility. The former may be fixed for
long periods; the latter can be varied only by additional investment: present
developed capacity establishes absolute or, via recycling, approximate ceilings
on production.
The other special constraint refers to the labor force. Mines are generally
not located in or near large labor markets. It is difficult to change the size
of the labor force quickly: geographic separation makes both significant
recruitment and dismissals difficult to accomplish quickly (in mining towns, labor dependence on the mine is very strong so contractual pressures are incorporated to prevent large contractions in short periods). This gives rise to two
constraints in each period: an effective ceiling and an effective floor on total
labor hours worked. The mine must use at least x and no more than y hours
each year.
One final constraint in the model applies to the interstage movement of
copper content from the mine to the market for refined copper. The weight
of material passed through by a given stage to the next as throughput is the
weight of the throughput received from the preceeding stage less the waste
lost through processing. Waste as a percentage of output is a function of the
type of activity chosen by the given stage. Interstage throughputs must conform to these relationships. For the mining stage throughput received from
prior stage is interpreted as amount of material extracted from the deposit.
F.

Mine Shutdown

Copper resources are a depleting resource. Unlike facilities past the mining stage, whose plant can be replaced (or simply maintained) on the same
site by investment, a given mine has an absolute termination when the deposit
in which it is based is wholly excavated. As noted earlier, however, the mine's
effective life can come to an end before (sometimes considerably before) its
deposit is exhausted. If the remaining reserves are of too low a grade to
promise profitability under processing (considering present and prospective
refined copper prices), they may be left in the ground. The mine may
cease operations temporarily or permanently, depending on prices and startup costs. Thus, a mine may shut down while part of the deposit remains
unexploited. On the other hand, the mine may not shut down in a period when
revenues fall short of costs, when losses are incurred. Operations may continue
despite current losses because of tax considerations or intertemporal calculations. Two related but different elements are involved.
First, the actual shutdown decision depends not on before-tax profits, but
on after-tax profits. Tax considerations may significantly decrease the negativity of profits. Intertemporal considerations may then be great enough to convert negative after-tax profitability into positive profitability within a larger
context.

[Vol. 43: No. I

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

1. United States Income Tax
In calculating tax liability for any year, positive profits (income) may be
offset by 100 percent of the total of any losses sustained by the firm in the
five previous years or in the five years ahead (for loss carry forward tax liability for any year is subject to revision in subsequent years as a result of losses
in those years). So a prospective loss at t. is not necessarily to be avoided by
shutting down. Since it serves to reduce the taxable income of some other
year, it represents a smaller after-tax loss to the industry overall. Since the
marginal tax rate on income is less than 100 percent, the loss carry over by
itself cannot transform a loss to a gain, but it can decrease the net size of
the loss.
The nature of the adjustment is complicated because the loss carry forward aspect involves expectations about the future (unlike loss carry back,
which simply involves an accouting adjustment).
Equation (6) 4 is explained as follows:
Expression (6a) is the five year carry-back alone: i.e., the presence of posi4.
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tive profits within the past five years totalling no less than Ho enables the loss
at to to have an immediate tax rebate in previous taxes paid. Thus, the full
offset to present loss is immediate. If profits in the past five years fall short of
H~o, expression (6b) becomes relevant. Total profits in the past five years are
offset for a full offset (first term). The balance is pushed to expected next
year's positive profits, I,; any remaining balance to the following year, H 2;
and so on until either the whole of Io has been distributed or the five year
period ahead is exhausted. Offset from future expected profits will only come
in those future years-and is only expected-so each such gain must be discounted back to the present. (The 8 terms are simply dummies to account for
whether total distribution of rio has or has not occurred with the preceding
year.)
The attractiveness of the tax carry over depends on the current unprofitable year being atypical, i.e., a positive profitability having recently
occurred or expected soon. Persistent losses, or downward expectations for
the future, will tend to decrease the contribution of the tax carry over in
maintaining operations in the face of a prospective current loss. This "neighborhood effect" is amplified in the shutdown and start-up cost factors.
2. Shutdown and Start-up Costs
The tax offsets convert negative before tax income in to into smaller negative after-tax income. Intertemporal choice considerations may convert these
to positive gains in a larger context and thus warrant continued operation. If
the mine were closed in to because of after tax losses, but was expected to be
reopened subsequently when profitability improved, certain shutdown and
start-up costs would have to be incurred, the former in t o, the latter when the
mine was reopened. A shutdown in to followed by a reopening in tj is rational
if output prices (production costs) are enough higher (lower) than at to to
make after-tax profits positive. Expectation at to such a pattern therefore creates an additional alternative: namely, to remain open from to to tj, thereby
sustaining operating losses but avoiding both shutdown and start-up costs.
Since these costs can be substantial, the savings might more than offset any
after-tax operating losses between t o and tj, thus making continual operation
over time more profitable than a stop-go pattern. This strategy will be attractive if the turn-around of profits is expected to come soon, the intervening operating losses are small, and the shutdown and start-up costs are
substantial.
Our actual treatment of shutdown and start-up cost criterion simplified
the above somewhat to avoid the unreality of specifying year-by-year expectation of prices and costs. At to we determine whether, given basic expectation
of the pattern of future prices and costs (a rising function of mine age), the

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 43: No. I

present discounted value of expected future returns from continued Ro
(which adjusts each Hi for LC), is positive or negative. If negative, a decision
to close the mine at to will not be reversed subsequently. Continued operation
at to in this case requires that after-tax returns at to be positive: i.e., that PD o +
LCo > -H1., which is contrary to assumption. But the present criterion is not involved, since no closure followed by reopening is envisioned. If R. > 0 although after-tax adjusted H0 is negative, i.e., fIo<o, then R 1 must also be positive (where R, is the present discounted value of future returns starting from
t,), and the option to shut down in to and reopen in t, is a real one. In this
case, the advantage of remaining open at to is the difference between the two
present values:
(7)

SSC

-

[HI

+ R] - [R, - SCO] = SCo + FI,

where SSC is the shutdown and start-up cost saving criterion, SCo is the
amount of shutdown and start-up costs, and 1 is the to loss offset by LC. If
SSC > 0, the avoidance of shutdown and start-up costs is a larger gain than
the avoidance of the after-tax operational loss in to; so the facility should stay
open and operate in to. SSC < 0 gives the opposite advice: shut down. It is
clear that tax considerations and temporal discontinuities enhance one another. Large tax offsets reduce present effective operational losses and make
intertemporal continuity less costly and so more attractive. Similarly, the expectation of continued operation despite temporary losses provides a more
probable future against whose tax profitability tax carry forward offsets can
be planned.
Mines will differ in the attractiveness of the intertemporal argument for
continuity. Since mining costs rise as a function of age but all mines have
to sell their output at the same prices, older mines have lower expected
profitability over any given future. Ro is less likely to be positive over even
moderate future stretches. So the stop-start option is less likely to be relevant
for them. Bad times that seem temporary for newer mines may result in permanent closure for old mines. Since we treat any given mine as having a life
cycle, it closes permanently at some point and thereby decreases the total mining capacity in operation. Our treatment of each production stage as an industry aggregate does not mean that all mines close at the same time. Nor
does it mean that the closing of any particular mine reduces aggregate
operating capacity permanently.
First, we treat the mining stage as having, in any period, a distribution of
mines at different stages in their life cycle and with different original depos-
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its. So mines differ in average grades and in mining costs per unit of output
of its then-average grade.
Second, previous industry exploration has established an inventory of underdeveloped deposits. When an existing mine shuts down, then, at the new
lower industry capacity, the investment criterion is used to determine whether
additional capacity in the form of new development of a hitherto undeveloped deposit is warranted. The average grade of this new mine is the average
grade of deposits discovered since beginning the hitherto newest mine.
Thus, a regular replacement of mine shutdowns is provided for, but only
to the extent warranted by the investment criterion.
Any social cost entailed by shutdowns is not the loss of capacity once represented by such closed mines since this will generally (or at least largely) be replaced by new mines: it is, rather, any metallic content prematurely left in the
ground (i.e., which could profitably have been, or in future be, extracted).
G.

New Mine Development

Decisions about new mine development are made in the model as follows.
We run the operations module for period t, and derive the shadow price on
"capital" for each mine. Since the current mines are arranged in terms of productivity (with differences due to original k and age) we expect these shadow
prices to be monotonically decreasing in this array. By our assumptions about
declining quality of explorational output over time, the queue of discovered
but undeveloped deposits arranged by declining average grade involves lower
productivities than the lowest of operating mines. So we use the shadow
prices of the two lowest present mine types in the investment criterion test. If
either passes the test, this means that additional mining capacity of the same
productivity as that mine type would be warranted (would increase the rate of
return in capital). But the next best capital at the top of the undeveloped
queue is less productive, so the addition of that mine might not be warranted.
We, therefore, provisionally enter additional new mining capacity (in terms
of size of deposit) to the extent indicated by the investment module of the
type of deposit highest in the undeveloped queue, and run the current operations module. If the objective function on the new run exceeds that for the
unaugmented industry, the investment is warranted. If it falls short, no investment is undertaken. Thus, capacity is too low, but the differentiated capital does not make it worthwhile to supplement it. This "scarcity" condition
continues until either market price of copper rises enough to warrant
introducing inferior capital, or the productivity of the existing mines falls
enough with increasing age to warrant supplantation-the substitution of a
new deposit for an existing one.
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Supplantation of Existing Mines by New Mines

In the real world each mine not only competes with all other operating
mines but also, implicitly, with undeveloped deposits as well. This is because
one firm may develop a new mine without another firm closing down one of
its mines. The downward effect this will have in the market price of copper
may result in one of the older mines becoming unprofitable and thus, closed
down. In effect, the older mine has been supplanted by a new mine.
We model this by testing every five years whether or not such supplantation would increase overall industry profitability. Every five years we provisionally introduce new capacity from the top of the inventory queue, with an
amount equal to the size of an individual mine of least productive currently
operating type, and remove the corresponding capacity of the latter. We run
the supplanted version and compare its overall profitability with the nonsupplanted state. If the test fails, no supplantation occurs. If it is successful,
we test for the supplantation by the same procedure, stopping only when the
overall industry profit can no longer be increased by futher substitution. This
establishes the optimal degree of supplantation.
I.

Exploration

The exploratory stage is integrated fully within the long run operation of
the model, but only permissively in the present moderate run application we
are discussing here. The function of exploration is to furnish an inventory of
new deposits which can be brought into mine development when warranted
by the investment criterion either to replace retired deposits or to add to existing capacity. In the long run, all of the present operating mines will be retired gradually and undeveloped deposits in the inventory will be called on to
replace them as warranted. The output flow from exploration could conceivably impose constraints on the ability of the industry to have as much
operational mining capacity as it would like from optimization considerations.
So exploratory activity is an essential determinant of the current production
of refined copper when such long term flows are involved. Our present application; however, considers only ten to twenty year impact sequences. For such
a near future, it is assumed that the present inventory of discovered but
undeveloped deposits resulting from previous exploration is more than
enough to replace existing mine retirements and provide any additional mining capacity that is likely to be desired.
For this reason, our treatment of the relationship between exploration and
postexploration operations is one way rather than two way: we treat downstream activities as affecting current exploration levels but not vice versa. The
linkage comes through the valuation of reserves in developed mines as described above. Given a valuation to such reserves that depends on prospective
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downstream activities, the value of comparable reserves in undeveloped form
can be calculated by the same principles we have used for bid price passthroughs at later production stages. The total cost of developing a deposit for
mining operation must be subtracted from the overall value of such a deposit
in developed form to arrive at the total undeveloped value of the deposit.
This value is the implied payoff to successful exploratory activity. It enters
into the prospective profitability of any incremental level of exploration in the
way stipulated in our exploration optimization model. That submodel is used
in the same way whether a long run two way linkage with the rest of the industry, or only the medium run one way linkage, is employed in the overall
industry model.
The model contains an exploration optimization submodel. It treats exploration as a process designed to produce information about probability distributions of successful mineral discoveries. The more exploratory activity that is
carried out in any area, the less intrinsic uncertainty about where and how
much metal is to be found remains, and informed choices can be made about
future extraction.
Increasing information about finds, whether positive or negative, can enhance the revenues of mining companies; it also incurs costs. The question of
where and how much exploratory activity should be carried out is one that
must be answered by balancing the expected gains from better information
with the costs of obtaining it. A formal treatment of the process is included in
the Appendix, at 146-48.
J.

Regulation and Compliance

We will focus on three forms of federal government regulation to
illustrate how the model lends itself to prediction of regulatory compliance
and impacts. The first is the land withdrawal policy; second, water rights; and
third, air pollution control. These have predominant impact on the exploration, mining-milling and smelter stages, respectively. For each kind of regulation, the model specifies a particular linkage between the operations at the
relevant production stage and either the input or output relationship that
generates a potential wider welfare impact on the society. This is the so-called
"externality link." Translation of this "externality" (in the broad sense used
earlier) into a social welfare impact comes via a "damage function," which
connects the particular externality to various types of social cost. The damage
function is part of the overall model system, but is outside the production
model itself.
In addition to the activity externality linkage, there is a link between the
regulatory regime and a set of constraints upon externality generation. Each
form of regulation specifies a ceiling or floor in usage of some input or gen-

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 43: No. I

eration of some inadvertent by product output. This "regulatory constraint
link" compares a set of constraints on industry operations which, along with
technical and capacity constraints, determine constrained maximization behavior.
Finally, there is a link between the particular devices and operational procedures adopted by each facility to comply with regulation and the consequences on generation of externalities. This is the "compliance impact link."
With the addition of information on the acquisition and operating cost of
each kind of compliance equipment, the cost of each procedural modification
used for compliance, and the cost of the capital equipment needed for each
major technology variant, where such variants influence externality generation, we can derive the industry's responses to adoption of each compliance
strategy both in terms of industry output and market price, and of changed
externality flow.
In a more elaborate application of the model we can predict which compliance strategy will be adopted by the industry, because, since the consequences
of each strategy include a level of objective function achievement (industry
profits), we can predict that the industry will adopt, out of the set of all strategies normalized to meet given regulatory standards, one that leaves the industry with highest profits.
1. Land Withdrawal
Some federal lands have been withdrawn from mineral exploration and
extraction by the National Park Service, the U.S: Forest Service, the Bureau
of Land Management and other agencies. Since exploration and mining have
been linked under this policy, the regulation is binding on the exploratory
stage: i.e., it makes a distinction between where exploration may and may not
take place. Once exploration has occurred, and successfully discovered a deposit, mining may proceed. Where exploration is not permitted, no mining
will occur. Thus, the constraint on mining is still only the presence of a
known deposit, not land withdrawals.
III
FEDERAL LAND WITHDRAWAL POLICY:
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS

Federal land withdrawals primarily affect the exploration stage. The cost
of this policy that we treat involves a decrease in expected profitability from
exploration and thus a decrease in the overall level of exploration carried out.
The benefit of the policy we treat in a somewhat more open way. It involves
preserving additional land for special alternative uses. We do not attempt to
place a money value on these uses, but provide a classification system that bet-
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ter permits policymakers to gauge their preference trade-offs between these
alternative land uses and the costs that have to be paid for them.
A.

Cost of Land Withdrawal Policy

The cost consequence of land withdrawals is subtle. Withdrawal removes
land from exploration that has about as high a probability of containing commercial grade deposits as any remaining open to exploration. But this in itself
is not a direct cost to the copper industry or the public, since a great deal of
land remains open to exploration that has as high a probability of success as
the land foreclosed and that has not yet been subject to exploration. So no actual diminution of exploration is forced because of lack of more than enough
exploration options. The cost is indirect rather than direct.
We treat the adverse impact of land withdrawal as contributing to a form
of "crowding" of exploration activity. Deposits are often found spatially clustered. Moreover, discovering the spatial extent of a single deposit requires
considerable explorative activity. If a first strike becomes known quickly, other
teams may enter the area and prevent the successful prospector from either
claiming the entire deposit or leisurely discovering additional deposits nearby.
The probability that such hasty incursions will occur depends on how spatially
clustered the explorational activities are. The more spatially concentrated they
are, the quicker and more surely information about successful strikes is likely
to spread, with competitive incursions following. So we can speak of a
"crowding" of exploratory activity in terms of this spatial concentration.
Greater crowding implies a greater likelihood of incursion and an earlier one.
Thus, it implies that a small percentage of total yield of any successful strike
can be appropriated by the first finder. Therefore, the extent of crowding is
inversely related to the percentage of the total value of any successful find
that can be realized by exploration.
Since explorational crowding is a function of spatial concentration of exploring behavior, land withdrawal affects crowding by influencing the degree
of exploratory concentration. The more high probability land that is withdrawn from exploration, the more exploration is likely to become spatially
narrowed. Since very little exploration occurs in such land withdrawal of low
probability land will not have this effect. Our treatment of the costs of land
withdrawal focuses therefore only on land where exploration might take
place.
We propose an "exploration crowding function" (ECF), which indicates the
percentage of total value of any successful find that the finder can expect to
appropriate (i.e., the capture percentage). This capture percentage depends
on explorational concentration. Since we consider only one exogenous source
of variation in that concentration in the time interval being considered,
namely, amounts of land withdrawal; we use either amount of relevant land
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available for exploration or percent of relevant land withdrawn, as the explanatory variable.5
Our data base permits the rough calculation that present federal
withdrawls have reduced available relevant exploration land by 40 percent.
For our analysis, we intend to examine the effects of five different withdrawal
levels. The crowding variable influences the amount of explorational activities
by plugging into the exploration model. 6 Variations in capture percentages as
a function of land withdrawal affects the expected capturable net earnings,
and thus the expected profitability of exploration. It thus should affect the total exploratory activity carried on.
B.

Benefits of Land Withdrawal Policy

The ostensible purpose of federal land withdrawals is to preserve additional land for uncorrupted wilderness use. The benefits of the program are
the values obtained from the uses of the land when exploration and mining

do not take place. We assume that alternative commercial development is not
5.

f (Relevant Land Availability) = g (% of Relevant Land Withdrawn)

Thus (1) w
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w = f(LA) = f(l-LW) = g(LW)
percentage of land in exploration potential grades 1 and 2 which is available for exploration
percentage of land grades 1 and 2 which have been withdrawn from exploration
Where LW
w -= % of full value of successful find which finder expects to be able to capture
The shape and position of this function have been estimated impresstionistically.
6. In very simple terms, let 0 be probability of a successful find; St be mean size to find at ti;
l 1 be mean grade of find at t,; PR be expected net mean (shadow) price of copper reserves over
the expected lifetime of the mine (net of mine development costs). Then:
(2) SjRiP = average lifetime net earning of deposit reserves (ignoring time discount discounting);
(3) 0SRjP = expected net earning from unit exploratory effort at t1 ;
(4) w( StRP = expected capturable net earnings from unit exploratory effort at t, (where 0 !5 w
S 1).
Where LA

-
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TABLE I

Policy Variant

LJl (=1-LA)

1.
2.
3.
4.

Present level
RARE II (Forest Service Plan)
Bureau of Land Management Roadless Plan
Tight Plan (Hypothetical)

A,
A,
A2
A,

5.

Open Land (except national parks)

A,

Variable Name

40
50
65
75
0

involved and that the alternative use is genuinely a wilderness use. Since no
market type bidding for the land is involved, there is no direct money value
in which the benefits from the wilderness use can be reflected. Moreover, various forms of indirect measurement suffer because current active
"users" of the wilderness do not exhaust the use of the land; they may not
even comprise the major part of its overall "social use."
For these reasons we do not attempt to give a monetary value of the land
uses preserved and enhanced via land withdrawal. We attempt to measure in
terms of a more "natural dimension," that is, units of the kinds of wilderness
service being preserved.
What exactly is a widerness use? It seems to consist of at least two distinguishable components: a recreational-aesthetic use and an archival-educational
use. The recreational-aesthetic use is close to being measureable in implicit
monetary terms, since there are substitute areas in which similar activities are
carried out. Where commercial areas are involved, we obtain a revealed value
of the services in terms of admission and camping charges. To compare tile
quality of the services in these commercial areas with those at issue in withdrawal, a technique that has been employed for recreational services of this
sort is to use the differential travel costs that tourists are willing to spend to
visit this rather than the former areas as a measure of the differential quality.
This is a questionable technique. It assumes, for one thing, that differential
travel costs are a good measure of differential values. This is not even a fair
approximation unless most tourists regularly consume both types of recreation as close substitutes so that their relative frequency of visits can be taken
to represent an optimal balance between the two where there is a marginal
equivalence between an extra commercial trip at its overall cost and an extra
noncommercial wilderness trip at its overall cost. There is reason to believe
that these lands are not generally treated as close substitutes for private recreational areas.
Even in recreational use, these areas are likely to have unique features. In
addition, there are educational uses for which this type of comparison is entirely beside the point. It is significant that we speak of the wilderness use as
being "preserved," not so much for recreation or even aesthetic pleasures, but
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simply to be preserved as a wilderness area. This is similar to the interest in
preserving historically significant documents or species of wildlife. It represents the critical role of humans as the custodians of their own and their planet's history, critical because human actions threaten to change it and to obliterate traces of the past. It is a genuine museum or archive interest and
appears to have deep roots and to be important. A significant part of this interest is that it facilitates an important kind of education about our natural
habitat. This archive interest does not seem to have any close substitute in a
market-type activity.
Our approach is to express land withdrawal consequences in terms, simply,
of amounts of additional acres that will be preserved for wilderness use. To
use wilderness acres in an undifferentiated way would be too crude. We can
create a scale of acres in terms of the presumed quality of the wilderness function that they are capable of performing. We make use of gradations in both
the recreational and educational elements of the wilderness function to construct this scale. It is subjective, but we believe that there is likely to be a high
degree of consensus on where individual tracts of land fit.
Our scale consists of the following wilderness gradations:
7 spectacular and unique in both archival and aesthetic values
6 high level uniqueness in both archival and aesthetic values
5 significant uniqueness in both (but other comparable examples exist)
4 high in archival or aesthetic values but not both
3 moderate degrees of both-many other examples exist
2 modest level of either and there is little scarcity of examples
1 no archival interest, low aesthetic value, and no scarcity.
In registering the gains from some variant of the land withdrawal policy, the
number of each kind of acre preserved is listed. But there is an implicit second kind of weighting procedure: the implicit value of each acre preserved
depends both on the wilderness grade (WG) and on the number of acres of
each grade already preserved.
The key to a benefit-cost analysis here is those withdrawn acres that have a
high exploration prospect. Benefits and costs refer primarily to these. Since
little or no exploratory activity is likely to take place on lower exploration
grade land, land withdrawal does not change their present or prospective use
much, if at all (so little, if any, benefits, regardless of their WG, will be created). Similarly, since little exploratory activity would be likely to have
occurred there, withdrawal does not change the spatial concentration of exploration or anything else (so there are little, if any, costs associated with this
kind of withdrawal).
The empirical magnitude of the issue is suggested by the following tables.
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TABLE I1
PERCENT

1
30

OF

ORIGINAL LAND

2
20

IN

3
20

WILDERNESS

4
10

GRADES

1-7

5
10

6
7

7
3

TABLE III
PERCENT OF

WG 1-7

IN

ALL ARIZONA WHICH

WITHDRAWAL

Policy/Grade

POLICY

ARE INCLUDED

IN

DIFFERENT

VARIANTS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ao

-

-

-

-

-

A1
A2

-

-

-

10
15

20
25

50
60
70
2

100
100

A,

-

-

-

-

100
100

TABLE IV
PERCENT OF

WG 1-7

Top

IN

PRESENT

1

2

-

-

Two EXPLORATION PROSPECT GRADES

WITHDRAWAL

UNDER

POLICY (A.)

3

4

5

-

-

-

6

7

100

-

TABLE V
PERCENT

OF

WITHDRAWN

BY

Policy/Grade

1

LAND

WITHIN

WG 1-7,

Top

PROSPECT

EXPLORATION

GRADES

BY POLICY VARIANTS

2

3

4

5

6

Ao

-

-

-

-

-

100

7

A1

-

-

-

(16,000)

A2
A3

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

16

82

(500)

(3,200)

(16,300)

12

23

65

(3,000)

(6,000)

(17,000)

0

0

0

0
0
0

Source for Tables II-V: Harbridge House Project, Applied Research on the Benefits and Costs
of Public Regulation of the Copper Wire Industry, NAT'L SCIENCE FOUNDATION CONTRACT ARP 77-19752 (1978).
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1. Water Rights
Water is an important input in mining and milling. It is obtained by two
major sources: (1) streams and rivers, and water development projects, (2)
wells. In the arid Southwest, water from running sources is so scarce relative
to user wants that it is allocated among users by formula. This is especially
true of water from state or federal water projects. Allocations are made on
the basis of water rights.

7

Water from running sources carry prices considerably lower than the cost
of water from wells. It is essentially free from natural sources and purchasable at subsidy-level prices from government development projects. The price
differential exists because of express public policy. Given the substantial differential, well water is used nevertheless because there is not enough water
available from running sources.
Water from wells on their own land is an internally developed resource for
mine-mill facilities. No externality is involved in obtaining this water. There is,
however, in using it: namely pollution of water runoff since this water flows
into or under other land and future use by others is affected by pollution.
Runoff pollution is also an externality for water obtained from running
sources. But obtaining water from running sources involves an "externality" in
the extended sense used here. The allocation of water from these sources is
not based on a price system that would guarantee use by most productive
users and reflect a balance between use benefits and the social costs of providing the water. The allocations have important political considerations; moreover, the prices fall far short of the social costs of providing the water. So
money paid by each mine-mill facility for running water does not necessarily
reflect the social opportunity cost of the water: either some other potential
user may have a higher use productivity or the value of resources used up in
generating it exceeds the value of what it produces, or both. Similarly, the
amount of water available to the facility via water rights is not necessarily the
amount for which its productivity is no less than for an alternative use (it
might well be the most productive user for considerably more).
Our treatment does not have to calculate adjusted values (shadow prices)
to compensate for these potential inefficiencies, however. We may treat both
the overall governmental subsidization and the "arbitrary" allocations as
embedding implicit social valuations (public decisions) that supersede the private valuations involved in free market prices. Moreover, since generally
water right allocations to mine-mill facilities fall significantly short of their
water needs, they supplement this source with privately owned well water.
Thus, the amount of water available from running sources and the price of
that water, are not responsible for marginal decisions at the mine-mill about
7. These are especially characteristic of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation water projects.
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operation levels and character. It is supplies of well water that enter into these
marginal decisions. Operational decisions are not very sensitive to allocations
and price subsidization, so large social benefits or costs are not involved in the
system vis ? vis mining. On both scores, therefore, we accept water rights allocations as reflecting consistent social valuations of running water use.
Though existence of the water right system necessitates no separate calculation of allocational inefficiency, a change in governmental allocation of
water rights, either through redistribution or newly developed water resources, can generally influence industry operations by changing input costs
at the mining-milling stages. We follow these via the operations model just as
changes stemming from any other form of regulation. But we do not, at the
same time, change the industry impacted externality vector since the changed
water rights allocation is itself the changed "externality" flow in this case. Similarly, no "damage" function needs to be used to transform a new allocation
into social benefits or-costs.

Runoff pollution is a different story. This is a genuine industry-generated
externality. Its size is assumed to be a direct function of the level of miningmilling operations. Each particular linkage is based on the character of the
compliance strategy to meet the current regulatory stringency. Change in the
latter leads to a change in the former, and thus to a changed relationship between the level and character of operation on the one hand, and the degree
of runoff pollution on the other. Of course, a change in regulations leads,
through a change in compliance strategy, to changed industry operations via
changed cost conditions. Thus the operations model follows.
In our present application of the model, we do not treat runoff pollution,
but only water rights distributions. The effect of changes in water rights distributions is complex. Suppose a mine-mill facility receives a smaller water
rights quota in period t than in to. Then the same activity level will require a
larger percentage of input water to come from wells than from running
sources. Because of the two price system this will result in both a higher marginal cost for water and higher total water costs. The first means a change in
marginal costs for the facility, and hence a likely decrease in planned operations. Both this decision and the higher total costs for any amount of water
that includes well water production should reduce facility profits and thus, industry profits. An increase in water rights distribution reverses the process.
2. Air Pollution
Practically speaking, air quality regulations 8 have had the most serious
regulatory impact on the copper industry. They affect primarily the smelting
stage. Sulphur dioxide emissions from the smelter are a classic form of narrow externalities. They presumably have important damage potential. Meas8.

Clean Air Act and amendments.
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ures necessary to control emissions are expensive and they do not decrease
such emissions to zero, so regulations prohibiting any degradation of air quality in pure airsheds (as opposed to regulations requiring an improvement in
already highly fouled air) have the practical effect of outright prohibitions
against new smelter capacity in the former such areas.
To deal with both the emissions side and the impact of regulatory compliance in the industry we use both the externalities and the operations models.
For the first we relate sulphur dioxide emissions to function of average activity levels, emissions control equipment, smelter technology, and timing of production activity. Different types of control equipment have different effects
on emissions as a function of activity levels. Different basic forms of smelter
technology also influence this externaltiy generation relationship. Finally,
while emissions as such are not affected by the timing of production, ambient
air quality has a variable, not fixed, relationship to emissions levels; the determinant of this relationship is weather conditions. A strategy of deliberate concentration of production into periods when weather quickly disperses emissions and so improves air quality (thereby decreasing the emissions damage
potential) coupled with significant production cutbacks under unfavorable
weather conditions, is a possible alternative to installation of control equipment. (Essentially, it trades off high marginal operations costs for high capital
equipment costs.)
To investigate the impact of these alternatives we add the capital cost of
compliance equipment (or the differential capital cost of the technological variant selected) to total operating cost, and any variable cost additions (via extra
energy, labor, maintenance, etc. per unit of output). This will affect profitability and, where variable costs are impacted, the optimization level of output. The application is straightforward.
K.

Simulation Scenarios

The operative model has been developed primarily to help predict the
consequences of changes in a number of different kinds of regulatory programs. It does, however, have a much wider potential than that. For one
thing, it can be used to examine the consequences of a wider variety of
regulatory programs than the few we have considered. In addition to this, it
can help trace various impacts of changes in different exogenous variablestechnologies, temporal profiles of world copper demand, or copper supplies
other than those in the United States. We intend to illustrate some of the
properties of the model by simulating several variants along these dimensions.
1. Mine Distribution
In each variant, there is a distribution of mine age and deposit quality.
The various simulations will vary the proportions of different mine characteristics in the distribution.
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2. Smelter Technologies
Presently a number of different smelter technologies are available. It is believed that the cost and effectiveness of each basic compliance strategy differ
for the different technologies. We intend to trace the consequence of each
regulatory change or model variants where: (a) smelting is successively represented by each of the technologies exclusively; and (b) in each period there is
a mix of technologies.
3. Market Price Trajectories Over Time
Because of the critical importance of intertemporal tradeoffs, expectations
about the future, and temporal irreversibilities, we intend to examine the importance of the temporal shape of exogenous changes. To this end we plan to
simulate the industry responses to exogenous changes that combine into refined market price effects that have different temporal patterns: monotonic
increases, monotonic decreases, alternations, etc.
4. Regulatory Regimes
We have been forced by project scope to concentrate on a few types of
regulation. For each of these; however, we intend to examine not only the effect on industry operations of different degrees of stringency, but also the
impact of the way regulatory requirements change over time, e.g., a single
change at the beginning of a ten year period, or the same change divided into
two equal installments. Each regulatory stance will be traced through its industry impacts, and each regulatory change as well, and some changes will be
traced in variant temporal patterns.
IV
CONCLUSION

This has been an account of the analytic framework, and some details of
the empirical model, used in a research project designed to measure and evaluate the benefits and costs of public regulation of the United States copper
inudstry. No attempt has been made to give an exhaustive picture, but rather
only the flavor of the chief theoretical emphasis, and an idea of how more
specific issues are dealt with under the approach.
Neither the model nor the larger project is explicitly addressed to the
question of innovation. Yet innovationary impacts are not only consistent with
the kinds of consequence chiefly addressed, but some aspects of innovation
can be illuminated by the model. Two aspects have been alluded to in our introduction. The first concerns the direct compliance adjustment to changed
regulatory requirements, especially at the smelting stage various available
technologies differentially suit different regulatory constraints. Decisions
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about net additions to existing facilities or replacement of these facilities may
involve selection of a different technology. Systematic investment tendencies
toward one technology also constitute a form of excess demand for additional
technical elaboration or progression in the particular directions that induced
the tilt toward that technology over the other available ones. So both modest
and more extreme innovation may result from these "defensive" adjustments
to regulation.
The second aspect refers to possible tradeoffs between this induced "defensive" innovationary activity and "initiatory" innovation-more general enhancement of productivity or commodity quality-not directly related to the
substance of regulation. In the copper industry, productivity goals are more
likely. The tradeoffs stem from common budgetary constraints. Where defensive adjustments come fiom R&D budgets and general capital funds, and both
are positively tied to retained earnings, rivalry with initiatory innovation activity derives from the latter dependence on the same budgetary constraints.
Changing R&D and capital budget stringency can be predicted from the model's predictions about changes in overall industry profitability resulting from
regulatory changes.
While a general multipurpose model, not specialized directly to innovationary issues, can throw this kind of modest, rather indirect light on
innovationary activity, its contribution to the area may be somewhat broader.
Innovation is not really a completely separable activity or dimension of the activity of business firms. It is related to other facets of business action. A general model of the firm or industry can provide a larger context of business
adjustment within which to view innovationary activity. Tradeoffs, symbiotic
linkages, and whatever degree of genuine independence from other dimensions, may be more effectively understood in the larger context. In addition
to this, innovation itself as a social goal does not stand isolated from other social goals. Its technical interrelation with other kinds of goals generates some
appreciation of both its social opportunity cost of incremental achievement
and also of its substitutability with other instrumentalities towards the same
more ultimate social objectives. Though the particular general model presented here is not centrally concerned with these larger issues, it can be used
to develop an awareness of these considerations and is offered in this spirit.

LEGEND OF TERMS
anode copper - refined copper on the positive terminal of an electrolytic cell
milling - the shaping and dressing part of the copper industry
mining - the process or business of working mines
refining - processing to make the copper free of impurities
smelter - that process that melts and fuses the ore

Page 112: Winter-Spring 1979]

EXHAUSTIVE RESOURCE INDUSTRY

APPENDIX

Exploration Optimization Model
While we attempt to explain and predict the behavior of individal facilities or types
of facilities at other production stages, we predict only the aggregate exploratory activity of the industry as a whole. This difference derives from the fact that some exploratory behavior is performed by newcomers to the industry who have no facilities at any
other production stage and are attempting to enter the industry by means of exploration. Unlike the other stages, new entry is a matter of engaging in what can be considered current operations, not new investment.
a.

Inputs

The inputs at this stage are various types (and locations) of land, A1 , A, A,3.
An, and labor L, and capital, K. (We abstract from the several types of labor and capital employed.) We distinguish two forms of exploration; an early, superficial reconnaissance, and exploration carried beyond some minimal level and designed actually to
discover deposit bodies. Reconnaissance is not designed to discover deposits but only
to narrow down alternative sites as candidates for real exploration. We consider reconnaissance an overhead activity and its inputs as a lumpy, fixed form of overhead characterized for convenience as a particular kind of input.
b.

Activities

There is initial reconnaissance, followed by a level of activity (including zero) on
each different type of land X1 .
c.

Outputs

The output of reconnaissance is detailed below for a number of land areas and an
initial winnowing out of areas for which the probability is so very low that, in effect,
no conceivable market and production conditions make real exploration worthwhile at
a given point in time (for a given period).
The outputs of exploration proper are additions of proven (i.e., sufficiently
drilled-out) reserves of different types, 'R,, PR, . . . Proven reserves are deposit bodies
of given character known to exist in particular areas but without an actual mine being
set up to exploit them in the following period. Development of these reserves into an
operating mine requires an additional "development investment," an action which depends on whether or not the gain to industry profitability from such action exceeds its
cost. The profitability of development is calculated in terms of the shadow prices on
reserves generated as part of mining stage optimization.
These different reserves are treated as forms of vintage capital at the mining
stage. Expected additions equal in number the activity level on ech: Xi (i.e., some level
of L, K and total acres) times the probability of each find.
d.

Output Values

Assume that at time t, the average expectted new deposit has a frequency distribution of reserve grades, R = (Ri, R2, . . . ) with density function equal to Gt(R), and
mean grade R(t), where G1 (R) is a function of the total accumulated copper discoveries
up to time t. Call this the "sandard find."
o _=probability of finding G t(R),
Production function for activity i:
(8) Oit = 0 (xit) all i
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where
(9) X, = min (EaIAi, EaLL, EaKK) all i
i.e., each exploratory activity requires fixed input proportions. Land of types 1, 2,
, n are graded in order of declining 0 for equal acres explored.
O(A,,L0,K 0)>O(A 2,L,K 0 ) >...
> O(A.,L,,K0)
where At = A 2 = A 3
...
A
e. Profits
The profit of each exploratory activity is the present discounted value of expected
increase in reverse wealth less the cost of producing that increase:
+
(10)
EflIt=
(wOitGtP)-(Pt + PL
L
+ PKt
Nit
(a0
Eai
- aKi )
(r)
all i
where

is the vector of shadow prices (values) of reserves at the proven state:
r is the industry discount rate
g is the gestation period for obtaining proven reserves
wis the earnings capturability parameter: percent of potential gains appropriable by original discoverer-impairment due to competitive
"crowding" of exploratory gain exploitation (to be explained below in
discussion of land withdrawal policy)
The prices of lands 1, 2....
n-whether explicit purchase or lease prices or the implicit competitive information, search and queueing costs-are a function of the supply
function of these lands, any absolute land availability constraints, and the opportunity
cost in terms of competitive uses:
(11)
P = A(Si,Vi)
where S, )s the supply function of land type i
VI is the opportunity cost of land type i in terms of other users.
PR

f. Objective Function and Linear Programming Optimization
The objective function for the industry as a whole at the exploration stage is an aggregate exploration profit function. The behavioral goal is assumed to be to maximize
this function:
(12)

max'Flt

=

n
I

fl (Xit)

iil

subject to:
(13)

Xit!!-Ai
Ea

*

all i

i

(14)

EH(Xi)-0

(15)

It

(16)

Oi =

K
(-,7)

e(xi)

all i
x

K*
all i
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(17)

(18)

(a) Pit

= A(Sjt,Vj1 )

(b) PLt

= PLO

(C) PKI

= PK'
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Xit-O

where * refers to a given capacity availability
Equation (13) stipulates land availability constraints for each type of land. Equation
(14) requires that no activity be undertaken that has a negative profit. Equation (15)
specifies an overall capital availability limitation at time t. Finally, equation (16) specifies
the technology to be used, equation (17) the relations determining input prices, and
equation (18) the requirement for non-negative activities.
The capital availability constraint is employed in lieu of an explicit treatment of disaggregated differences in risk preference and opportunity costs of capital, nonlinearities in input-output relations, and actual rising shadow prices as well as rationing
of capital availability. Alternative formulations involving non-linearities may be explored subsequently.

